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New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice
After Connick v. Thompson
ELLEN YAROSHEFSKY*
INTRODUCTION

This year, two highly publicized Supreme Court cases drew national attention to prosecutorial misconduct in the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office.
Connick v. Thompson' and Smith v. Cain2 both involved significant and disturbing failures to disclose information to the defense as required under Brady v.
Maryland.3 Both cases were tried during the nearly thirty-year tenure of Harry
Connick (1974-2003) and defended in the Supreme Court by the current District
Attorney, Leon Cannizzaro, who was elected in 2008.
In separate trials, John Thompson was convicted of attempted robbery and
of capital murder, and incarcerated for eighteen years-fourteen of those in
isolation on death row.4 A few weeks before his execution date, a defense
investigation found exculpatory evidence in the robbery case that had been
withheld from his trial counsel by prosecutors and law enforcement, including
blood evidence.5 Once tested, the evidence established his innocence; the
robbery case was dismissed and the murder conviction was overturned.
The prosecutors retried Thompson separately on the capital murder charge.
He was acquitted, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and won a
$14 million damages award on the theory that the Office failed to train
prosecutors on their constitutional responsibility to turn over exculpatory and

* Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Jacob Burns Ethics Center in the Practice of Law, Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law. I thank all of the interviewees who graciously gave their time and energy to this
endeavor. Laura Schaefer, student research assistant at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, deserves
inestimable praise for her invaluable work on this article. @ 2012, Ellen Yaroshefsky.
1. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (holding that defendant John Thompson did not demonstrate a pattern of disclosure
violations by the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office sufficient to sustain a damages award on a "failure to
train" theory of municipal liability).
2. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (overturning the conviction of Juan Smith upon a finding that New Orleans
prosecutors failed to turn over significant impeachment evidence, including conflicting statements of the sole
eyewitness, to the defense).
3. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court established that "the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment." Id.
4. 131 S. Ct. at 1355; Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836,844, 865 (5th Cir. 2008), aff'dby divided en banc
opinion,578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
5. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.
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impeachment information. The Supreme Court reversed. 6 In Connick v. Thompson, a controversial 5-4 decision, the majority characterized the Office's blatant
misconduct as "a single Brady violation," 7 and held that a District Attorney's
office may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train its
prosecutors based on a single Brady violation.
Justice Ginsburg, reading her dissent from the bench, disputed the characterization in Thompson's case as a "single Brady violation" and noted the longstanding
Brady problems in Orleans Parish:
[Former New Orleans District Attorney Harry] Connick, who himself had been
indicted for suppression of evidence, created a tinderbox in Orleans Parish in
which Brady violations were nigh inevitable. And when they did occur,
Connick insisted there was no need to change anything, and opposed efforts to
hold prosecutors accountable on the ground that doing so would make his job
more difficult. 8
The following term, the Court returned to the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in Connick's office. In Smith v. Cain,9 the Court ordered a new trial for Juan
Smith following revelations of the prosecutor's failure to disclose Brady material
that was "breathtaking both in its scope and in its exculpatory and impeachment
value."o Smith's conviction was based solely on the eyewitness testimony of a
survivor. The prosecution had failed to disclose numerous inconsistent statements of that survivor as well as other impeachment information. The Justices,
asking "one incredulous question after another,"" expressed frustration with the
argument of the Orleans Parish District Attorney that the suppressed material was
not covered by Brady. Justice Scalia was brusque: "Surely it should have been
turned over." 1 2 The decision to reverse the conviction was supported by eight of
nine Justices on the Court. Clarence Thomas, who authored the majority opinion
in Connick, dissented.13
These were not the first Supreme Court cases to address Brady violations in
New Orleans. In the 1995 Connick-era case Kyles v. Whitley, the Supreme Court

6. Id. at 1366.
7. Id. at 1358 (determining that the issue was whether "Thompson could establish municipal liability for
failure to train the prosecutors based on the single Brady violation without proving a prior pattern of similar
violations").
8. Id. at 1387 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
9. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
10. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (No. 10-8145).
11. Adam Liptak, Justices Rebuke a New Orleans Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/11/09/us/supreme-court-rebukes-a-new-orleans-prosecutor.html.
12. See Bruce Alpert, U.S. Supreme Court Justices Question Handling of Evidence by Orleans Parish
Prosecutors,TIMES PICAYUNE, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2011/11/us.supreme-court
-justicesques.html.
13. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1387 (2011).
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overturned the conviction of Curtis Kyles on similar grounds." Kyles's
conviction for murdering an elderly woman in a parking lot was based upon
eyewitness testimony. Later it was discovered that the prosecution had suppressed witness statements containing inconsistencies that would have been
significant at trial.' 5
The Supreme Court admonished the prosecution for its conduct: "[ilts
responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable."' 6 Apparently, the Kyles decision had
little impact upon the practices of Connick's office, now renowned for its Brady
violations.' 7 This was no surprise. As Connick stated in his testimony in John
Thompson's civil case nearly 20 years later: "I stopped reading law books .
when I became the D.A., and looking at opinions."18
In 2008, Leon Cannizzaro was elected District Attorney of Orleans Parish,
assuming office four months after the Fifth Circuit upheld John Thompson's
$14 million award by a Louisiana jury against his predecessor.1 9 He vowed to
implement changes in the Office's practices and operations. During his election
campaign in 2008, he ran on the promise of fulfilling three goals: "Reestablishing public confidence by prosecuting murder cases that have sat on the
docket for years; expanding the diversionary program for first offenders; and
stopping the 'revolving door' of youthful offenders at Juvenile Court."20 Once
elected, he directed his office to put into place a series of measures to address the
Office's prosecutorial practices and culture, 21 and appointed Graymond Martin, a
former police official, as First District Attorney. Martin's role in the administration includes the design and implementation of systemic changes, including
changes to the Office's discovery practices.
This Article explores the changes in Brady practices in the Orleans Parish
District Attorney's Office in the Cannizzaro administration. 2 2 1 sought to determine the extent to which new policies and practices have been implemented
and the extent to which the Office's Brady practices have changed. How can and

14. 514 U.S. 419, 441 (1995).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 438
17. See Brief for the Orleans Public Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Smith v. Cain, infra
note 32.
18. Transcript of Record at 183-85, Thompson v. Connick, No. 03-cv-2045, Dkt. No. 178 (E.D. La. Feb. 6,
2007) (Connick testimony).
19. Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1350.
20. See David Winkler-Schmit, Strategiesfor Reform: The FourCandidatesfor Orleans ParishDA Promise
Top-to-Bottom Improvements in the Beleaguered Offices, GAMBIT ONLINE, Sept. 30, 2008, available at
http://www.bestofneworleans.conVgambit/strategies-for-reform/Content?oid= 1251342.
21. Interview with Graymond Martin, First Assistant Dist. Attorney, Orleans Parish, (Feb. 3, 2012). Some of
those measures and practices are discussed in this Article.
22. "Brady practices" refers to policies and practices designed to comply with Brady v. Maryland and its
progeny.
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how does the prosecutorial culture in New Orleans adapt to the post-Connick v.
Thompson era? To answer this question, this Article draws in great measure
upon interviews with key stakeholders in the New Orleans criminal justice
system, including the First District Attorney, former prosecutors (including
those involved in the aforementioned Supreme Court cases), former judges,
defense attorneys, civil rights attorneys, criminal law teachers in New Orleans,
and criminal justice policy experts.2 3 After reviewing the scant literature24 on
the Office's Brady policy, I conducted interviews with eighteen Orleans Parish
lawyers and judges The interviews revealed surprisingly disparate views of
disclosure practices in the current office. 25 As described below, new Brady
protocols have been operational, notably within the last few months, but it
remains unclear whether the Office's history of noncompliance with Brady
obligations is a feature of a broader and deeper culture of prosecution that will be
impervious to new protocols in office policy.
Changing from a culture of nondisclosure to one that more readily conforms to
new policies that facilitate compliance with Brady requirements is a difficult and
ongoing process. The interviews revealed that lawyers in New Orleans see few
signs of positive change in prosecutorial practice or culture. Some interviewees
even suggested that the current caseload under the Cannizzaro administration and

23. The interviewees secured were promised anonymity. Graymond Martin, First Assistant District Attorney,
agreed to have his name and programmatic initiatives mentioned. Some initial interviews were conducted by
telephone in November and December 2011. Follow-up and other interviews were conducted in person from
February 2-5, 2012. To ensure anonymity, the citations included in this article are only to "Interview," as well as
to the date on which the interview took place.
24. There are few academic sources that contain up-to-date information on recent policy changes in the
Cannizzaro administration. Aside from interviews, which form the basis for the majority of the information
contained in this Article, most of the available information about the operation of the Parish D.A.'s Office is
found in newspaper articles, primarily in publications such as the TIMES PICAYUNE, and in recent reports from
policy organizations working in New Orleans since Hurricane Katrina, such as the Vera Institute. See, e.g., THE
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: NEw ORLEANS OFFICE, available at http://www.vera.org/project/new-orleansproject [hereinafter VERA INSTITUTE REPORT]. Criminal justice advocacy organizations such as the ACLU and
the Innocence Project all compile a significant amount of information about the criminal justice system in New
Orleans, as well. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERIES UNION: LOUISIANA, available at http://www.aclu.org/
affiliate/louisiana; see also THE INNOCENCE PROJECT NEw ORLEANS: CAUSES/CURES, availableat http://www.ipno.org/causes-cures. Recently published books are also helpful in illuminating the practices of the Orleans
Parish District Attorney's Office. See generally JOHN HOLLWAY & RONALD M. GAUTHIER, KILLING TIME: AN
18-YEAR ODYSSEY FROM DEATH Row To FREEDOM (2010) (providing a compelling in-depth analysis of the John

Thompson case, as well as a penetrating view of prosecutorial culture in the Connick administration).
25. This, of course, is not unusual. In any system there are likely to be disparate views among stakeholders as
a result of professional bias-all professionals tend to form opinions in line with their roles and duties, even in
relation to ethical and moral judgments. See, e.g., Mervin H. Needell, Are Medical Ethics Different From Legal
Ethics?, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 31, 31 (2001) (addressing whether professional bias and lawyers' and doctors'
distinct roles can actually impact moral judgments and intuitions). In the context of stakeholders in the criminal
justice system in New Orleans, however, professional bias alone does not seem to account for the disparity in
views between prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other criminal justice experts involved in the system. While
one expects a range in viewpoints as a result of phenomena such as professional bias, the extent to which the
views of criminal justice stakeholders in New Orleans differ is startling.
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other workplace pressures make it worse, or at least as bad, as before. Enforcing
Brady disclosure is but one of the serious challenges confronting the criminal
justice system in New Orleans. As described in Section VI below, it is a challenge that likely can be met only through changes in both internal and external
accountability measures. This Article sets forth an agenda for reform that
includes changes in internal policies and practices, legislative implementation of
full open file discovery, and external accountability through judicial enforcement,
the disciplinary system, and the creation of an independent commission.

I.

THE NATIONAL CONTEXT OF BRADY OBLIGATIONS AND VIOLATIONS

Despite prosecutors' nearly 50-year-old obligation to disclose favorable
information to the defense as established in Brady v. Maryland,2 6 compliance
with disclosure requirements remains one of the most contested issues in the
criminal justice system. Discovery obligations nationwide are a patchwork of
state and federal statutes and ethics requirements 27 that, taken together, are
confusing and provide disparate views as to the scope of information that must be
revealed under Brady.2 8 Scores of convictions are reversed each year for Brady
violations, but the appellate standard for reversal of a conviction is only where
the withheld evidence had a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome (the
"harmless error" rule). 29 This "harmless error" rule dilutes appellate supervision

26. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United
States v. Bagley, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-270 (1959); Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. at 78, 88-89 (1935); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, reh'gdenied, 294 U.S. 732 (1935).
27. This fundamental point has recently been the subject of numerous articles, legislative proposals
and conferences related to revisions in the ABA Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Function. 1,
among others, have explored this previously. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialDisclosure Obligations,
62 HASTINGs L.J. 5, 1323 (2011) (and articles cited therein) ("[Prosecutorial disclosure obligations] are
informed by [. . .] various sources [. . .] which include federal and state constitutional provisions, as interpreted
by courts, federal and state statutes, court rules and orders, and state ethics rules. Another [nonbinding] source
that guides prosecutorial disclosure decisions is the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
Function."). See NACDL Model 18 U.S.C. § 3014 (2011) (proposing broadening current disclosure guidelines to
include "all information ... that may reasonably appear to be favorable to the defendant with respect to the
determination of guilt, or of any preliminary matter, or of the sentence to be imposed").
28. See, e.g., U.S. DisT. CT. RuLEs D. MAss., LR 116.2, §A(1-4) (amended by 2012 MASS. COURT ORDER
3002 (C.O. 3002)) (the government is required to turn over all exculpatory evidence that may "cast doubt on
defendant's guilt. ., cast doubt on the admissibility of [the government's] evidence . . ,cast doubt on the
credibility or accuracy of [the government's] evidence ... , [or] diminish the degree of the defendant's
culpability"); see also OHIo REV. CODE ANN. CRIM. R. 16, § B(5) (2009) (requiring the government to turn over
"any evidence favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment").
29. See Janet Moore, Democracy and CriminalDiscovery Reform after Connick and Garcetti, BROOKLYN L.
REV., (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at n.5) (citing studies of prosecutorial misconduct and harmful error
resulting in the overturn of criminal convictions); see also Emily M. West, Court Findings of Prosecutorial
Misconduct Claims in Post-ConvictionAppeals and Civil Suits Among the First255 DNA Exoneration Cases,
INNOCENCE PROJECr, (Aug. 2010), www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject-Pros-Misconduct.pdf
("While not a perfect comparison, there has been one large, nationwide study, by the Center of Public Integrity
on prosecutorial misconduct which found that among all 11,452 documented appeals alleging some type of
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of disclosure obligations.30 Without uniform oversight of prosecutors' disclosure
decisions, it is difficult to know how many violations actually occur. If evidence
is lost, neglected, or actively suppressed, and no one comes forward with it, this
evidence may go undiscovered by the defense. In a study of sixty-five recent
DNA exoneration cases, a report on prosecutorial misconduct and successful
post-conviction appeals found that nearly twenty percent of cases were reversed
as a result of harmful error on the part of the prosecuting attorneys-primarily
because of failures to disclose evidence favorable to the defense." Even in
prosecutions not involving DNA evidence, the error rate is likely to be similar.
Other factors also account for disclosure failures.3 3 Within any given local
jurisdiction, strained relationships between police departments, the District
Attorney's office, and defense counsel may hinder vital communication of information. Even where the prosecution and police sustain an ongoing effective
relationship, information does not always "flow" as quickly or efficiently as it
should.34 Some police officer training protocols advise that officers should
conduct "materiality review" of evidence themselves and independently determine what information needs to be disclosed under Brady.3 5 But this determination is supposed to be for the prosecution, not the police, and it is likely to result

prosecutorial misconduct between 1970 and 2002, 2,012 appeals led to reversals or remanded indictments,
indicating harmful error-a rate of 17.6%. This is nearly identical to the rate of harmful error findings in the
DNA exoneration cases of 18%.").
30. United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D. Mass. 2009) (reported cases cannot measure scope
of disclosure violations).
31. See West, supra note 29 ("Results from this study indicate that of the 65 DNA exoneration cases
involving documented appeals and/or civil suits addressing prosecutorial misconduct, 31 (48%) resulted in
court findings of error, with 18% of findings leading to reversals (harmful error).").
32. Brief for the Orleans Public Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Smith v. Cain, 565
U.S. _
(2012) (No. 10-8145), 2011 WL 3706111, at 6 n.3 ("Of course, [the rate of prosecutorial misconduct
calculated by studying error on appeals] is likely to be 'a gross underestimation of the number of cases in which
evidence may have been suppressed' because many Brady violations-which by their nature involve hidden or
suppressed evidence-never come to light.").
33. Lack of competent defense counsel also exacerbates disclosure failures, as such lawyers may neglect to
uncover material or potentially exculpatory evidence because they do not diligently pursue prosecutors, police
officers, and crime labs to reveal all relevant information. Exoneration cases involving allegations of Brady
violations often correlate directly to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL.,
FIVE DAYS To EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROMTHE WRONGLY CONVicrED: ACTUAL INNOCENCE, Ch. 9

(1st ed. 2000) (describing cases in which ineffective counsel by defense attorneys has resulted in convictions,
lost appeals, and sometimes even death sentences for indigent defendants).
34. See Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations:Report of the Working
Groups on Best Practices,31 CARDOZo L. REv. 1961, 1973 (2010) ("In many jurisdictions, there is no formal
mechanism for ensuring that all case-related documents and materials are provided to prosecutors. Often, the
procedure is informal, based upon implicit understandings and expectations. And even then, prosecutors often
do not receive copies of all information developed by police.") [hereinafter Cardozo Law Symposium].
35. See Richard Lisko, Agency Policies Imperative to Disclose Brady v. Maryland Material to Prosecutors,
THE POLICE CHIEF, (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?
fuseaction=display.arch&articleid=2329&issueid=32011 (recommending that police departments implement policies taking into account what information constitutes Brady material and creating a standardized
system of turning this information over to prosecutors).
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in the failure of the prosecution to obtain information.
Caseload pressures and the emphasis on quickly prosecuting defendants and
securing convictions can also influence the frequency or likelihood of disclosure
violations.3 6 Some prosecutors may fear that disclosing evidence to the defense is
detrimental to their own cases and will "tack too close to the wind" in examining
disclosure obligations.37 Although broadening criminal discovery guidelines is
likely to reduce Brady violations, most District Attorneys' offices have not often
shown support for the implementation of broader criminal discovery statutes.
While a few states have adopted fairly broad criminal discovery guidelines, and
local offices often implement versions of an "open file" discovery system, this
practice of broadening criminal discovery obligations is not the norm.
When misconduct is uncovered, few jurisdictions provide adequate and
consistent means of addressing it.3 9 While some District Attorneys' offices are
beginning to recommend the imposition of professional discipline upon prosecutors found to have engaged in deliberate misconduct,4 0 prosecutors often escape
censure for repeated disclosure violations, even in their own workplaces. In

36. See Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce Green, Prosecutors'Ethics in Practice: Influence on Prosecutorial
Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN CoNTEXTc*
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN PRACTICE Ch. 13 (Leslie C. Levin and
Lynne Mather eds., 2012) (discussing two high-profile cases in which District Attorneys withheld exculpatory
evidence from defense counsel, presumably amid intense pressure to win their cases); see also Joel B. Rudin,
The Supreme CourtAssumes Errant Prosecutors will be Disciplined by their Offices or the Bar: Three Case
Studies that Prove thatAssumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 537 (2011).
37. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind
will disclose a favorable piece of evidence"); United States v. Zinnel and Eidson, No. S-ll-0234 (E.D. Cal.
2011); see also Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 36 passim.
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAr. § 15A-903-910 (2012) (the North Carolina criminal discovery laws, which
now require the prosecution to provide the defense with all the information obtained during the criminal
investigation); see also FL. R. CRIM. PRoc. 3.220(b) (2011); MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 9.01 (2010); N.J. CouTr R.
3:13-3(a)-(c) (2011) (all examples of criminal discovery statutes that are broader than the norm); U.S. DIST. CT.
RuLEs D. MASS., LR 116.2, §A(l-4) (amended by 2012 MASS. COURT ORDER 3002 (C.O. 3002) (the government
is required to turn over all exculpatory evidence that may "cast doubt on defendant's guilt .... cast doubt on the
admissibility of [the government's] evidence .. ., cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of [the government's] evidence . .. [or] diminish the degree of the defendant's culpability"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. CRIM. R.
16, § B(5) (2009) (requiring the government to turn over "any evidence favorable to the defendant and material
to guilt or punishment"). See infra for a discussion of the meaning and content of "open file" discovery.
39. See, e.g., Rudin, supra note 36, at 540 ("A number of commentators and scholars already have found
that... the discipline of prosecutors rarely occurs. They also have analyzed the existing mechanisms for
internal and external prosecutorial oversight and found that ... such mechanisms fail to provide an effective
structure for prosecutorial accountability."); see also Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to
Discipline Unethical Prosecutors. 36 HOFsTRA L. REv. 275 (2008); Bruce A. Green, ProsecutorialEthics as
Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573 (2003); Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack of) Enforcement of Prosecutor
Disclosure Rules, 38 HOFsTRA L. REv. 847 (2010).
40. See Dist. Attorneys Ass'n of the State of N.Y., "The Right Thing": Ethical Guidelinesfor Prosecutors,
6-7, (2011), available at http://www.daasny.org/EthicsHandbook%208-11-ll.pdf (possible consequences of
misconduct include censure, being fired, being formally reprimanded, demoted, criminally prosecuted, or
civilly sued for damages).
41. See David Keenan et al., The Myth of ProsecutorialAccountability after Connick v. Thompson: Why
Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against ProsecutorialMisconduct, 121 YALE
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New Orleans, no prosecutor has ever been sanctioned for misconduct-even
when such misconduct was deliberate. 2 The first New Orleans prosecutor to be
brought before a state disciplinary committee and found to have engaged in
misconduct 4 3 had his sanction suspended because the committee noted that he
was the first prosecutor ever to be disciplined for a Brady violation."
Nationally, the lack of accountability for prosecutorial misconduct-either
through disciplinary systems, court sanctions, or civil liability-is glaring, and a
topic of ongoing concern. Scholars and commentators have long argued that
accountability measures including the imposition of discipline, judicial sanctions, and statutes imposing civil liability are essential to reduce negligent or
intentional violations of Brady and other disclosure requirements.45 In addition to
those external accountability measures, a court rule or statute requiring full open
file discovery and pretrial disclosure compliance conferences are among the
recommendations to improve criminal justice system discovery practices.
Internally, enforceable policy and practice changes are essential to improve
compliance. As described below, New Orleans under District Attorney Cannizzaro has at least begun the internal process to improve disclosure practices as
required by Brady.

L.J. ONLINE 203, 205 (2011) ("Our findings, based on an investigation into the professional conduct rules and
attorney discipline procedures of all fifty states, suggest that disciplinary systems as they are currently
constituted do a poor job of policing prosecutors.").
42. See Campbell Robertson & Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Looks Again at Methods of D.A.'s Office in
Louisiana,N.Y TIMEs, (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/1l/03/us/orleans-district-attomeys-officefaces-us-supreme-court.html?pagewanted= all.
43. The use of the term "prosecutorial misconduct" in reference to all Brady violations is itself contentious.
While good faith is immaterial to a finding of a due process violation when exculpatory evidence is withheld
from a defendant, the American Bar Association (ABA) recommends distinguishing between intentional and
unintentional misconduct in determining whether to sanction prosecutors. Its resolution calls for the use of the
term "error" to refer to unintentional violations, and to reserve the term "misconduct" for instances when "a
prosecutor knowingly or intentionally violates a constitutional or legal requirement." Prosecutors resist the
notion that most Brady violations are intentional except in extraordinary circumstances such as in Connick. See,
e.g., ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATE REPORTr No. 1OOB (Aug. 2010); see also Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 36, at
269 ("Prosecutors believe that intentional misconduct ... is highly unusual; many defense lawyers dispute their
claim.").
44. "In 2005, the Louisiana Supreme Court barred Mr. Jordan from practicing law for three months for
withholding evidence in a different case. Noting that was the first time that court had ever disciplined a
prosecutor for violating the Brady decision, the court suspended the punishment." Campbell, supranote 42.
45. See generally Moore, supra note 29; see also Cardozo Law Symposium, supra note 34; Peter A. Joy, The
Relationship Between ProsecutorialMisconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for A Broken
System, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 399, 425 (2006) ("For example, an open file discovery obligation would help to
eliminate one of the major forms of prosecutorial misconduct-the suppression of material evidence, which is a
leading cause of wrongful convictions. Under an open file discovery regime, the prosecutor could still seek a
protective order to withhold some information from the defense counsel, but such a system would require a
court to review the request.") (internal citations omitted).
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II. THE CULTURE OF THE NEW ORLEANS PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND ITS
HISTORY OF BRADY VIOLATIONS

"Anything related to criminal justice and its misuse has to focus on New
Orleans. It makes everywhere in the country pale by comparison."4 6
New Orleans is notorious for its high crime rate and overburdened criminal
justice system. 47 The city is also plagued by racial tensions, which play a
significant role in its politics and the administration of the criminal justice
system. This was true long before Hurricane Katrina devastated the city in 2005,
destroying much of its law enforcement and criminal justice infrastructure. 4 8
It is not a secret that, before Katrina, the New Orleans criminal justice system
had long been plagued with inefficiencies and structural barriers that interfered
with the fair administration of justice. Before Katrina, almost all criminal justice
system agencies in New Orleans faced substantial funding problems and had
been repeatedly criticized for weak management. 4 9
Since Katrina, New Orleans has struggled to rebuild its infrastructure despite
constraints on manpower and resources.50 An overriding difficulty is coping
with the crime rate in New Orleans. A Department of Justice study found that the
murder rate in New Orleans is "ten times the national average," 5 making
New Orleans the "nation's most murderous city."5 2 Similarly, as of 2009, New
Orleans had the "highest rate of incarceration of any major city in the United
States-almost three times the national average."5 3 New Orleans' remarkably
high crime rate has put pressure on law enforcement officials and prosecutors to
be especially vigorous in responding to crime. In 2007, for example, former
District Attorney Eddie Jordan was compelled to resign, at least in part, because

46. Interview 5 (Feb. 2, 2012).
47. See Overview of the Vera Institute of Justice New Orleans,Nov. 1, 2011 ("[Before Katrina] New Orleans
led the nation in its local detention rate and spent one-third of its budget on public safety, yet violent crime and
community distrust of the system ran sky high. The city's criminal justice system was troubled and inefficient
before Hurricane Katrina-and devastated afterward."); see also After Katrina: Washed Away? Justice in
New Orleans,THE URBAN INSTITUTE: JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, Aug. 2007, http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/
411530_washedaway.pdf [hereinafter URBAN JUSTICE].
48. Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution After Hurricane
Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 127 (2006) ("The ... criminal justice system collapsed after Hurricane Katrina,
resulting in a constitutional crisis. Eight thousand people, mostly indigent and charged with misdemeanors such
as public drunkenness or failure to pay traffic tickets, languished indefinitely in state prisons. The court system
shut its doors, the police department fell into disarray, few prosecutors remained, and a handful of public
defenders could not meet with, much less represent, the thousands detained.").
49. URBAN JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 1.
50. See generally URBAN JUSTICE, supra note 47.
51. See Brendan McCarthy, New Orleans Criminal Justice System is Stronger Every Day, DA Says, TIMES
PICAYUNE, Jan. 26, 2011, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2011/01/districtattorney_1eoncannizz1 .html.
52. Id.
53. American Civil Liberties Union, In for a Penny: The Rise ofAmerica's New Debtors'Prisons,Oct. 2010,
17 n.6, http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny web.pdf.
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of his failure to successfully prosecute several high profile cases.54
Harry Connick has had a long-lasting and controversial impact on New
Orleans during his twenty-nine years as the Parish's District Attorney (1974 to
2003). Over the course of his tenure he was re-elected five times, 5 and at the end
of his final term he was given an award for distinguished service from "'Drug
Czar"' John P. Walters "in recognition of exemplary accomplishment and
distinguished service in the fight against illegal drugs."5 Under Connick, New
Orleans began to receive almost as much attention for its record-high rate of
incarceration as for its record-high murder rate.
The current District Attorney, Leon Cannizzara was elected in 2008. Since
then he has expressed ongoing concern about New Orleans' crime rate. He has
regularly promised to make the city's response to crime "very tough .. . for local
criminals."5 In his annual address in 2010, he promised to "do whatever it
takes"58 to prosecute more violent felony cases, even though the Office has long
struggled under its caseload.5 9 At this same address, Police Superintendent Ronal
Serpas vowed to take on the Herculean task of "mak[ing] New Orleans safe."6
Although the police department is itself the subject of ongoing scrutiny for
incidents and practices involving brutality, misconduct, and corruption,6 1 it
remains committed to a public image of being "tough on crime."
In examining the New Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, whether under
the term of Harry Connick or current District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro, an
overview of often mind-numbing concerns is essential to contextualizing any
discussion of changes in prosecutorial disclosure policies. New Orleans' system
is unique and infamous. Its complexity contributes to an environment where
Brady violations are persistent. The high rate of violent crime and the distinctive

54. See David Meeks, D.A. Eddie JonianResigns,TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 30,2007, http://blog.nola.com/timespicayune/2007/10/sourcestalksunderwayfor-jor.html ("[Jordan's] unprecedented move [out of office] ends
a tenure mired in criticism over a widely perceived failure to successfully prosecute violent criminals.").
55. See Executive Profile, Harry F Connick, BLOOMBERG Bus. WEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/
research/stocks/people/person.asp?personld= 6843928&ticker= PMD:US&previousCapld= 298401&previous
Title= Psychemedics%20Corp.
56. Id.
57. McCarthy, supra note 51.
58. Id.
59. See URBAN JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 4 ("Before Hurricane Katrina the DA's office had been routinely
criticized for its high attrition rate and inexperienced attorneys. [Several years later, in 2007,] although the core
staff is steadily working its way through the backlog of cases and appears to have a sufficient number of
attorneys, the office remains critically short on staffing for the important auxiliary services.").
60. McCarthy, supra note 51.
61. A Department of Justice civil investigation "produced a scathing report on [the New Orleans police
department's] practices and will eventually lead to a consent decree, a legally mandated blueprint for reform."
Campbell Robertson, Officers Guilty of Shooting Six in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/us/06danziger.html?pagewanted=all. The DOJ report referred to the
"aorta of corruption" in reference to the New Orleans Police Department. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Investigation of
the New Orleans Police Department (2011), availableat http://www.justice.gov/crtlabout/spl/nopd.php.
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set of political forces which permits the elected District Attorney to remain "one
of [the] two most powerful people in New Orleans"62 are among the most significant factors in understanding the operation of criminal justice in New Orleans.
The New Orleans system's history-and many would argue its current structure-is "rife with conflicts of interest, political corruption and incestuous behavior."6 3 State and local funding for judicial administration, prosecutors' offices,
and defense attorneys is minimal, requiring that the Parish finance its criminal
justice system through other means.M It is financed in part by "competing
enterprises-the courts and the D.A."65 For example, probation fines and pretrial
diversion monies go to financing the court's judicial fund as well as to the New
Orleans District Attorney's Office.66 Similarly, the Office also collects revenue
from sources such as fees charged on debt collection, where a "state law ... allows a district attorney to charge a 20 percent fee for collecting on worthless
checks over $500.",67
Key stakeholders in New Orleans all mentioned a weak and underperforming
judiciary as another significant factor in the poor quality of the criminal justice
system. Those interviewed pointed to the problematic relationship between
prosecutors and judges. "The District Attorney controls the judges. He scares

62. "The Sherriff is the other power." Interview 1 (Dec. 1, 2011); Interview 4 (Jan. 18, 2012); Interview 6

(Feb. 2, 2012); Interview 8 (Feb. 3, 2012). It is widely understood in the context of New Orleans that the Sheriff
plays an extremely important role in the city's administration and politics. In discussing the appointment of
Ronal Serpas to head the New Orleans Police Department in 2010, Mayor Landrieu said, "As mayor. .. my top
priority is to transform the culture of death on the streets of New Orleans into a celebration of life .... The first
step, the one step that needs to be taken, is to find an individual who will help lead the New Orleans Police
Department." Mitch Landrieu Names Nashville Police Chief Ronal Serpas as New Orleans'Top Cop, TIMES
PICAYUNE, May 6, 2010, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/05/new-orleansnative ronal-serpa.html.
63. Interview I (Nov. 15, 2011); Interview 5 (Feb. 2, 2012); Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012).
64. See David Winkler-Schmit, The Life of a New Orleans PublicDefender, TIMEs PICAYUNE, Feb. 21, 2009,
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/the-life-of-a-new-orleans-public-defender/Content?oid = 1255673
("The Orleans Parish District Attorney's office has an annual budget of approximately $12.5 million, with 92
attorneys on staff and a total of 200 employees-including 18 investigators and six social workers. The DA
covers Criminal and Juvenile courts, receiving approximately 15,000 cases a year from the New Orleans Police
Department. Of those, the office accepts roughly 7,200 for prosecution. Compare those numbers to the public
defenders' office, which covers cases in Criminal, Municipal, Traffic and Juvenile courts and handles 50,000
cases a year on a budget of $5.4 million. The office has 42 attorneys among 77 total employees, including eight
investigators and two social workers."); see also URBAN JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 4 ("Louisiana is the only state
in the country that attempts to fund its indigent defense system almost entirely through local revenue, primarily
traffic tickets and other court costs.").
65. Interview 6 (Nov. 17, 2012) and (Feb. 3, 2012). Reflecting on the system's financing and its political
nature as responsible for causing serious problems, one policy expert remarked, "Anything related to criminal
justice and its misuse has to focus on New Orleans. It makes everywhere in the country pale by comparison." Id.
66. Interviews 4, 8, 17 (Feb. 2-3, 2012).
67. See John Simerman, New Orleans District Attorney's Office Could Get $300,000 for Collecting
$1.5 Million GamblingDebt, TIMES PICAYUNE, Nov. 12, 2011, availableat http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/
2011/1 I/new orleansdistrictattorneys.html ("Debt collection, under threat of prosecution, has been a boon
for Cannizzaro's office, particularly on behalf of Harrah's. According to the financial documents, the district
attorney has taken in $177,000 in fees over the past year, on top of $860,000 paid to the victims. More than 40
percent, or $73,000, has come from collecting on debts for [a local casino."]).
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them with use of the bully pulpit. They have to get elected and it is daunting
without the support of the D.A. and Sheriff." 6 8 Disturbingly, stakeholders also
reported, "The trial judges do not possess the work ethic of judges in other
jurisdictions. Working three hours per day appears to be the norm."
The notoriously poor quality of public defense prior to Katrina makes matters
worse.70 The Orleans Public Defenders (OPD) was formed following Hurricane
Katrina in 2007 and is funded by state, local, and federal grants." Despite
OPD's recognized achievements 72 and improvements to the system of indigent
defense, the Office has been experiencing ongoing budget crises in recent years.
In February 2012, OPD announced its decision to lay off twenty-seven
employees-nearly one-third of its total staff--due to budget shortfalls.
Although with the establishment of the Orleans Public Defenders the city has
undergone significant positive reforms in its approach to indigent justice, many
aspects of the system that undermine the efficient administration of justice
remain in place today.74
E. Pete Adams, Executive Director of the statewide District Attorneys
Association, recently commented about the criminal justice system in New
Orleans. "[T]he system down there has been fairly dysfunctional for a while
because of the political battles between judges and the DAs, the defense bar and
the DAs," Adams said, "Everybody's fighting down there. It's always been kind

68. Interview 7 (Feb. 2, 2012).
69. Id.; see also Interview 2 (Dec. 13, 2011); Interviews 5, 8, 15, 18 (Feb. 2 and 3, 2012).
70. See also URBAN JuSTCE, supra note 47, at 4-5 ("Long before the storm hit, the OlD [Orleans Indigent
Defender] Program had been especially deficient, plagued by unreliable funding and conflicts of interest, and
failing to adhere to standards that govern the provision of indigent defense .... Many stakeholders interviewed
believe that the catastrophe of Katrina has given New Orleans a unique opportunity to reform the court system,
and with it, the OID program.").
71. "The Orleans Public Defenders (OPD) was created in 2007 to provide defense to people who cannot
afford an attorney in Orleans Parish. The new office received funding from the state and federal government to
hire and train a full-time staff able to meet the demands of the justice system." THE ORLEANS PUaLIC DEFENDERS,
OUR HISTORY, http://www.opdla.org/history.html (last visited June 12, 2012).
72. "The accomplishments of the Orleans Public Defenders since then have been tremendous and were
recently recognized by the Southern Center for Human Rights (SCHR). SCHR awarded the office with the
Frederick Douglass Award in 2009." THE ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS, OUR HISTORY, supranote 71.

73. See John Simerman, PublicDefender Layoffs Could Gum Up the Works at New Orleans Criminal Court,
TIMES PICAYUNE, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.nola.com/crimelindex.ssf/2012/02public-defender_.ayoffs
could.html ("A bloodletting this week at the Orleans Parish public defender's office will mean a slowdown
at Criminal District Court and leave many defendants on a waiting list for a free lawyer, Chief Public Defender
Derwyn Bunton said Thursday. Bunton said he was forced to lay off 27 employees, including 21
lawyers-nearly a third of the public defenders on his staff-in the latest move to trim a deep shortfall in the
office's $9.5 million budget."); see also Laura Maggi, Orleans ParishPublic Defenders Cut Services Because of
Lack of Funds, TIMES PICAYUNE, Dec. 21, 2011 ("The public defender office has been asking both the city and
state governments to pony up more operating dollars in recent years, saying it needed financing as grants
obtained in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina dried up. In recent years, the state public defender board has
helped out, finding extra money at the end of the agency's fiscal years.").
74. See VERA INSTITUTE REPORT, supranote 24.
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of like a war zone."
III. THE OFFICE's BRADY POLICIES AND PRACTICES
The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Kyles v. Whitley focused national
attention on the New Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office's Brady policies
and practices. 76 Kyles, a capital case, involved prosecutors' "blatant and repeated
violations of [that] well-settled constitutional obligation" in Brady, and featured
"so many instances of the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.
Despite the Court's reversal of the defendant's conviction in Kyles, Connick
made no documented changes to the Office's disclosure policies or procedures.
"Connick indicated that he 'saw no need, occasioned by Kyles, to make any
changes' in his office's practices with respect to Brady compliance ... because
he was 'satisfied with what [the] policy was.' 78 Years later, he testified, "I think
what sticks out in my mind most [about Kyles] is it wasn't a Brady case."
Thus, it is hardly surprising that "[t]he prosecutors' record of compliance
with Brady remained dismal even after Kyles, as evidenced by several Brady
violations that prosecutors committed in trials after April 1995-including in two
capital cases."8 o Indeed, of the more than 100 Brady claims arising in state and
federal court during Harry Connick's tenure as Orleans Parish District Attorney,
prosecutors were found to have withheld evidence in approximately half of the
cases and the courts ordered relief in nearly one-third of the cases.8
John Thompson's capital case was the epitome of egregious intentional
misconduct during the Connick administration.8 2 John Thompson was convicted
and sentenced to death after being charged with two separate crimes: murder and
armed robbery. The prosecution, suppressing blood evidence which ultimately
proved that Thompson was innocent of the robbery, made the decision to try
Thompson on the robbery charge prior to his murder trial. This calculated
decision virtually ensured that, if the prosecution were successful at the robbery
trial, he would not take the stand in the subsequent homicide trial.8 Convicted at
75. John Simerman, Former DA Harry Connick Defends His Leadership, Reputation, TIMES PICAYUNE,
Apr. 1, 2012, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/04/formerda-harry-connickdefend.html.
76. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). Connick maintained his belief in Curtis Kyles' guilt even after the Supreme Court
overturned the conviction in his case, and as District Attorney he unsuccessfully attempted to retry Kyles five
more times before finally abandoning the effort.
77. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. Brief for the Orleans Public Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 32, at 9
(citing Transcript of Record at 184-85, Thompson v. Connick, No. 03-cv-2045, 2004 WL 1772060 (E.D. La.
June 18, 2007) (Connick testimony)) (internal citation and brackets omitted).
79. Thompson v. Connick, No. 03-cv-2045, Dkt. No. 178, 183 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2007) (Connick testimony).
80. Brief for the Orleans Public Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 32, at 10.
81. Moore, supranote 29, at 9.
82. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
83. A defendant with a prior conviction for robbery would be highly unlikely to testify in a subsequent
capital murder case where his prior conviction would be prime impeachment material.
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both trials, Thompson spent eighteen years in prison.
A pro-bono legal team working on Thompson's behalf while he remained on
Louisiana's death row fortuitously discovered that "a swatch of fabric stained
with the carjacker's blood had been tested and never produced to the defense." 84
Later testing of this fabric revealed that the blood did not match Thompson's.
As it turned out, one of the prosecutors on Thompson's case, Gerry Deegan,
had made a deathbed confession to a former colleague, Michael Reihlmann, that
he had hidden the blood swatch and report from the defense at trial. Some five
years later, after the defense team's discovery of the blood evidence, Reihlmann
came forward to reveal Deegan's confession. Eventually, Thompson's convictions were reversed, the robbery case was dismissed, and he was retried for the
homicide and acquitted in less than an hour.85 Of the five prosecutors involved in
Thompson's wrongful conviction, the only one to be disciplined was Michael
Reihlmann, who was the whistleblower for the prosecution's misconduct.
Justice Ginsburg's strong criticism of the former District Attorney in Connick
v. Thompson (see infra note 8) is likely due, at least in part, to Connick's sworn
statements in the record. In his testimony during the civil case, Connick not
only admitted that he "stopped reading legal opinions" 87 when he became
District Attorney, but he also "misstated Brady requirements"8 8 and confirmed
that prosecutors in his office received "no formal training" regarding Brady
evidence."
Apparently, Connick and lawyers in his office learned little from Kyles and
subsequent cases in which their Office was reproached for violating constitutional Brady requirements. Following Thompson's celebrated exoneration,
Connick remained steadfast in his belief that Thompson was indeed guilty. As in
Kyles, Connick would only concede that procedural errors accounted for the
reversal of the conviction. Connick remarked, "I think that [Thompson]
committed ... a murder, and I think that obviously we thought we had enough
84. See Nina Totenberg, Man Wrongly Convicted: Are Prosecutors Liable?, NPR NEws, Apr. 2, 2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/04/02/135053529/man-wrongly-convicted-are-prosecutors-liable.
85. The appellate court found that it was the "intentional hiding of exculpatory evidence" that caused the
violations of Thompson's right to testify and present a defense, which in turn required a new trial on the murder
charge. State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002), rev. denied, 829 So. 2d 427
(La. 2002); 825 So. 2d at 557 (reversing order denying Thompson a new trial).
86. See Keenan et al., supra note 41, at 219 ("Indeed, only one of the five prosecutors responsible for
violating John Thompson's constitutional rights has ever been disciplined by the attorney grievance system in
place in Louisiana. Ironically, that prosecutor is Michael Riehlmann, the only one of the five who was not
directly involved in prosecuting Thompson's case or implicated in any of the Brady violations that occurred and
the only attorney to ever report the violations to Louisiana's Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC)."); see also
HOLLWAY & GAUTHIER, supra note 24 (documenting Connick's dismissal of the recommendation to prosecute
two of the prosecutors in John Thompson's case, which ultimately resulted in resignation of a prosecutor who
presented the criminal conduct of the Thompson prosecutors to the grand jury).
87. See Keenan et al., supra note 41, at 207.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1379-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
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evidence to gain a conviction." 90 This view persists among some former
prosecutors, now defense lawyers, who said of John Thompson's case, "If you
were really innocent of the murder and had an alibi, your butt should have gotten
on that witness stand. The prior robbery conviction? You voir dire it out." 9 '

IV.

LOUISIANA: UNIQUE JUSTICE AMONG THE FIFTY STATES

Discovery laws in Louisiana are narrow, 92 and prosecutors in Orleans Parish
under Connick were famously reluctant to disclose any evidence to defense
attorneys. A former prosecutor said that in the Connick era, the Office had an
"aggressive attitude with respect to disclosing potentially helpful evidence to the
defense,"9 4 and further noted that the Office standard was to respond to defense

attorneys' disclosure requests by declaring them "not entitled" to the informationregardless of the substance of the request. 9 5
State court judges in Louisiana have also expressed dissatisfaction with
prosecutors' attitudes towards disclosure in New Orleans, in some circumstances
even holding prosecutors in contempt for failing to turn over Brady evidence.
However, judicial reprimand of the District Attorney's Office is rare. The
perception among all interviewees was that many judges do not understand or
enforce Brady obligations.97 As a former prosecutor recounts, "The stuff you can
90. Id.
91. Interview 10 (Feb. 2, 2012). This prosecutor, who was in the office during Thomspon's civil case and is
now a defense lawyer, believed that conducting jury voir dire about a defendant's prior conviction would be
sufficient to insure lack of bias against the defendant when he testifies. This is an unusual view among defense
lawyers. Any discussion with seasoned defense attorneys reveals that it is rarely the case that voir dire can
remove the negative effect upon the defendant's credibility of a prior conviction for a violent felony.
92. See LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 716 (2011); see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 718 (2011)
(advising that the District Attorney is only required to provide evidence "favorable to the defendant and which
[is] material and relevant to the issue of guilt or punishment . .. on motion of the defendant"). The language of
these statutes is important, as it is inconsistent with federal constitutional law requiring disclosure of favorable
evidence material to guilt or innocence regardless of whether requested by the defense.
93. See Campbell Robertson & Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Looks Again at Methods of D.A. 's Office in
New Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/us/orleans-district-attorneysoffice-faces-us-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all ("Even Mr. Connick's successor, Eddie Jordan, came
close to acknowledging as much in a 2003 interview with The Times-Picayune. 'The previous administration,'
he said, 'had a policy of keeping away as much information as possible from the defense attorney."'); see also
Brief for the Orleans Public Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 32, at *9.
94. Interview 12 (Feb. 3, 2012).
95. "One former assistant district attorney in Connick's office attributed this unsettling record to the office's
traditionally aggressive attitude with respect to disclosing potentially helpful evidence to the defense. He
explained in an affidavit that the practice 'was to be as restrictive as possible with Brady information .. . . The
policy was when in doubt, don't give it up."' Brief for the Orleans Public Defenders as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 32, at *6.
96. "Judge Calvin Johnson repeatedly sounded the alarm regarding what he perceived as a 'pattern ...
not just based on lethargy, but on an active unwillingness to follow the rule of law.' To encourage compliance
with Brady, he often 'held prosecutors in contempt' or 'ordered them to take law classes."' Id. at *7 (internal
citations omitted).
97. Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012).
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get away with [in court] is amazing. The degree of formality? It is very informal.
Most of the judges do not know law, although one was a walking encyclopedia.
They sometimes disregard it." 98 Another former prosecutor remarked, "'Abundance of caution' in the judicial explanation of an action is a telltale phrase that
they did not know [the] law."9 9
Reflecting on his years in the District Attorney's Office, a highly regarded
former prosecutor who questions whether the Office is even committed to a due
process model said, "Part of our problem is the Napoleonic Code."'0 Because
of its French and Spanish heritage, Louisiana is the only state in the nation with
a legal system that derives from a civil law, rather than a common law, framework.'0o Although the state is obligated to observe constitutional requirements-of which Brady obligations are a part-so many aspects of the legal
system in Louisiana are unique to that state that some stakeholders may feel as if
they operate outside of the requirements of the rest of the country.
A seasoned policy expert reflected, "Federal law really does not matter much
[here], because how many cases can the Supreme Court take? We are in
Louisiana, and to the extent we follow the law, it is local law. The entire system is
lawless." 10 2 For example, prosecutors may provide discovery ex parte to the trial
court and consider doing so a fulfillment of their Brady obligations, although
disclosure under Brady requires prosecutors to provide the defense with all
potentially favorable material.10 3 In Smith v. Cain, for example, some of the
evidence that eventually came to light was in the court's hands-but the court did
not provide it to the defense. A New Orleans prosecutor remarked, "Look at
Smith v. Cain. We said that we gave the information to the court. It was not our
problem that the court did not turn it over."' 04Some prosecutors thus believe that
the problem lies with the judges themselves for failing to ensure that defense
attorneys receive exculpatory evidence. "Brady problems belong to the court too.
They have the information."10 5
Connick was replaced in 2003 by former United States Attorney Eddie Jordan,
who enjoyed a brief tenure before resigning in 2007. Prior to leaving the District

98. Interview 10 (Feb. 2, 2012).
99. Interview 11 (Feb. 2,2012).
100. Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012).
101. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, I Civ. L. COMMENT 1 (2008), available at
http://www.civil-law.org/vOliOl-Yiannopoulos.pdf; Louisiana's Napoleon Complex: The French Influence on
Pelican State Jurisprudence,SLATE MAGAZINE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/
explainer/2005/09/louisianas-napoleonscomplex.html.
102. Interview 5 (Feb. 2, 2012).
103. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
104. Interview 10 (Feb. 2, 2012).
105. Interview 12 (Feb. 4, 2012). It is noteworthy that the Louisiana appellate and Supreme Court upheld
Juan Smith's conviction and did not consider the egregious failure to disclose information as a Brady violation.
Some interviewees suggest that the Smith case exemplifies the failure of the judiciary to understand and enforce
Brady.
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Attorney's Office, Jordan admitted that the Office's policies under Connick
regarding discovery obligations were troubling.' 0 6 Jordan, however, had no
opportunity to reform the Office's disclosure policies. Almost immediately
after taking office, Jordan fired forty-three white employees, purportedly in an
effort to overhaul the Office. These discharges ignited allegations of racism and
resulted in a lawsuit. In 2005, "a federal jury found that Mr. Jordan, [New
Orleans'] first black district attorney and a Democrat, had discriminated against
43 white employees when he summarily fired them."10 7 The damages resulting
from the lawsuit-totaling nearly four million dollars-threatened to bankrupt
the Office.
Following the crisis visited upon the city by Hurricane Katrina, the District
Attorney's Office could not withstand the weight of the civil damages suit.
Jordan, who was at that point immensely unpopular, was forced to resign.
Significantly, his inability to successfully prosecute several cases had already
turned public opinion against him. 0 8 Many appeared glad to see him go. Some
prosecutors hired by Jordan, however, believe his office "was headed in the right
direction."' 0 9 "Under Jordan," one said, "we were free to make decisions based
on facts, evidence and the law. Cases were judged on merit alone."" 0 After the
scandal following Jordan's resignation, "politics came into play and the lawyers
became a player in a game.""' Such was the view of many of the interviewees
who worked in both administrations. And, despite the Office's changes since
Connick's 2003 departure, Brady violations have persisted.
V. THE NEW ORLEANs D.A.'s OFFICE UNDER LEON CANNIZZARO
New Orleans District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro is regarded as hard working
and savvy with the media. His administration sought to address a range of issues
at the outset; compliance with Brady requirements was one of them. Doing so
was unavoidable: the $14 million judgment against the Parish in John Thompson's civil suit was awarded four months into Cannizzaro's tenure, and it focused
national attention on the Office's disclosure practices. The Thompson case was a
highly publicized embarrassment for an already beleaguered criminal justice
system, causing significant public outcry and threatening to visit a significant cost
upon a city already buckling under economic hardship.
Graymond Martin, appointed First Assistant District Attorney in the Cannizzaro administration, undertook responsibility for evaluating and overhauling the

106. See Robertson, supra note 61.
107. See Adam Nossiter, New Orleans ProsecutorQuits Amid Lawsuit Woes, N. Y TIMEs, Oct. 31, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/3 1/us/3 1orleans.html.
108. See Meeks, supra note 54.
109. Interview 15 (Feb. 3, 2012).
110. Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012).
111. Id.
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Office, including its approach to complying with Brady requirements. While
Cannizzaro has responded to the pressure to modify the Office's Brady practices,
the administration remains circumspect when speaking on the record about the
breadth of the misconduct under Connick. In an interview with a New Orleans
publication focused on the District Attorney's Office policies after Smith and
Thompson, Cannizzaro said, "There have been some [bad] cases. But whether it's
a pattern of deliberate indifference [that existed under Connick], I just can't
say."' 1 2
Martin, who has had a long career in the police department and is highly
regarded as a "systems person," examined and redesigned many aspects of the
District Attorney's Office. Among the changes Martin put into place was the
decision to move all misdemeanor cases to a lower court so that his office could
focus attention on serious felonies."' He also changed the Office's internal
structure for case assignment, screening, and follow-up to maximize effective
case processing. Moving to a system of "vertical prosecution,"" 4 the office
instituted a process of committee screening all serious crimes,"' requiring the
lawyer who will handle the case to attend this initial committee meeting.
According to Martin, "The process makes it hard for one or two lawyers to do
something inappropriate. The changes were not driven by Brady concerns, but
that was a consideration.""' 6
The Office also now requires a highly structured review of all cases. No case
obtains a plea offer without approval at the highest levels. Disclosure decisions
are made at the highest levels as well. With high turnover and few lawyers with
more than five years of prosecution experience, this is a tested method to ensure
quality control of significant case-related decision-making. Nonetheless, this
significant change from prior administrations has been viewed skeptically and is

112. See Kevin Allman, The Gambit Interview with Leon Cannizzaro, GAMBrr ONLINE, (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/the-gambit-interview-leon-cannizzaro/Content?oid= 1920156.
113. Other significant changes beyond the scope of this Article include working with police agencies and
crime laboratories to improve evidence collection, testing, recording and transmission. According to Martin,
"[c]rime laboratories were dysfunctional after Katrina. The state police were taking rape kits to private
contractors who would send back CODIS hits. Those hits were kept in a drawer. We had to change all that."
Interview with Graymond Martin, supra note 21 (Feb. 2, 2012).
114. "Vertical Prosecution" is a system in which a prosecutor is assigned to a criminal case from
investigation onwards. A system of vertical prosecution is presumed to contribute to judicial efficiency, and to
speed the rate at which documents such as police reports are completed and transferred to the D.A.'s Office. "In
the context of New Orleans, Cannizzaro hopes that a system of vertical prosecution can lead to trying "every
homicide defendant within 12 months of the date a murder was committed." David Winkler-Schmit,
StreamliningJustice: DA Leon Cannizzaro and the Public Defenders' Office Agree that 'Vertical Prsecution'
Would Move Cases Faster at Criminal Court, but Some Judges Oppose the Idea, GAMBrr ONINE, (Mar. 1,
2010), http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/streamlining-justice/Content?oid= 1256863.
115. These crimes include homicide, rape, kidnapping, and sex crimes. Office systems internal forms (on file
with author).
116. Interview with Graymond Martin, supra note 21.
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criticized by some of the Office's former prosecutors.17 "The office is managed
to a 'T.' Even where a person is charged with marijuana possession, the lawyer
must go up to the D.A. to get permission to offer a plea."' 18 This was a common
perspective: "You can't do anything on your own because every decision must go
through a higher up. Disclose or not to disclose? You cannot decide. They must
give you approval. They tell you 'turn this over-don't turn that over.' It is
impossible to do something on your own but they blame you [if something goes
wrong.]"" 9 Another former prosecutor was disillusioned: "When something hits
the fan-first thing is to blame the ADA."1 2 0
Moreover, several former prosecutors recounted specific instances of being
"thrown under the bus" for decisions made at the highest levels. "[I]t's all
politics-any good politician needs to master the art of passing the buck.
[Cannizzaro's] office does that and did it historically."'21 Whether such instances
are representative of Office practice appears beside the point. The culture accepts
this "passing the buck" as fact, and young prosecutors are fearful of getting
blamed for errors they may be unable to anticipate-especially in a system that
does not appear to trust them to make simple day-to-day decisions.12 2
In perhaps Cannizzaro's most significant and controversial change, the
administration now rarely exercises its discretion to screen cases to determine the
merit of prosecution. Instead, the Office prosecutes most cases brought to them
by the police. This change was made in an effort to improve relationships with
police agencies. The acceptance rate of prosecutions from police agencies for
2008 to 2011 averaged 87 percent: the highest rate in the country. 123 This new
policy has resulted in a conviction rate of only about 57 percent a year-in
comparison with offices that utilize effective screening processes and have
convictions rates upwards of 80 percent.124 But officials believe that raising
the acceptance rate will result in an overall improvement of the quality of cases
and evidence brought to the office, as it will foster greater trust between the
police department and the District Attorney's Office.1 2 5 Just as prosecutors
grow frustrated with police if evidence in a criminal investigation is lost or
mismanaged, police departments grow frustrated with District Attorneys' offices

117. All interviewees discussed this process and its varied effects.
118. Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012).
119. Interview 10 (Feb. 2, 2012).
120. Interview 9 (Feb. 2, 2012) ("ADA" is the assistant district attorney).
121. Interview 11 (Feb. 2, 2012).
122. All former prosecutors interviewed expressed frustration about their lack of basic discretionary
decision-making.
123. Washington D.C. has a comparable rate.
124. Data from New Orleans Parish for 2008-2011 (on file with author); See J. Mark Ranseyer et al.,
Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor'sChoice, at 22, available at NELLCO Legal Scholarship
Repository, Harvard Law School (2008) (documenting conviction rates in jurisdictions above 80%).
125. Interview with Graymond Martin, supra note 21.
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if they regularly fail to accept cases for prosecution.12 6
The Office also instituted training programs to educate prosecutors about
Brady requirements. Cannizzaro said that he "instructed lawyers on his staff to
study the Supreme Court decisions relating to prosecutorial misconduct, including the one involving the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office in 1995
[(Kyles)]."l27 The Office conducts "multiple continuing legal education classes
each year on these issues."l 2 8 No doubt, the Thompson and Smith cases are a
focus for all New Orleans prosecutors. 129
Criminal justice policy experts, civil rights attorneys, and some defense
lawyers commend the systemic changes, particularly the Office's efforts to
promote efficiency through vertical prosecution and to ensure that police
agencies provide necessary documentation to the defense. A common view of
Graymond Martin is that "he is a good guy trying to make changes."l 3 0 Another
interviewee noted, in light of Martin's background, that "Martin has a deep
understanding of law enforcement practices and systemic changes necessary to
ensure compliance with obligations."13 '
However, most interviewees were skeptical about the changes, and their
comments demonstrate that the high acceptance rate of cases from the police
has significant unintended consequences. Although the salary at the District
Attorney's Office has increased over the last several years,13 2 it is still low
relative to the enormous pressure on lawyers prosecuting crime in New Orleans.
The low pay, miserable hours, and increased pressure to take on a growing
number of cases under Cannizzaro's new acceptance rate policy makes it difficult
for prosecutors to remain in the Office for long, and contributes to a culture
where Brady compliance is not likely to change much from the Connick era.
"There are lousy cases. We have to prosecute them."1 3 3 Another former
prosecutor remarked, "I could deal with the hours and the low pay-I loved the
job. I stuck it out as long as I could, but I could not deal with the constant

126. Remarks of District Attorney to Orleans Parish City Council.
127. See Allman, supra note 112.
128. Robertson & Liptak, supra note 93.
129. Interview with Martin, February 2, 2012. Effective training programs require more than the reading of
case law and discussion of civil liability. There is little information to suggest that the New Orleans Office has
implemented an effective training program. See Cardozo Law Symposium, supra note 34, at 124 (discussion of
the components of effective training programs).
130. Interview 4 (Jan. 18, 2012).
131. Interview I (Nov. 15, 2011). Systemic changes-including case processing, case conferences,
recording and record keeping systems-appear to be significant. A full discussion is beyond scope of this article.
132. "Before Katrina, the DA's office had been routinely criticized for its high attrition rate and inexperienced attorneys. Stakeholders interviewed hinted at inadequate compensation for assistant district
attorneys (ADAs), whose starting salary was roughly $30,000 before Katrina .... In mid-July 2007, the office
announced major changes in the staffing structure .... Salaries of entry-level ADAs were raised from $30,000
to $50,000, and salaries of violent crime prosecutors were raised to $80,000." URBAN JusncE, supra note 47,
at 2.
133. Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012).
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second-guessing and lack of support from the higher ups." 1 34 A third former
prosecutor summed it up: "Turnover under Cannizzaro is 'insane.'" 3 5
The high rate of acceptance is not likely to change soon, despite various
internal and external complaints. As one former prosecutor noted:
The high rate of acceptance works well in the press. He accepts more cases than
any other D.A. in America. There are many garbage cases and many people in
jail who don't belong there [as a result]. Louisiana is such an outlier in the
criminal justice world, and New Orleans is the outlier within the state. 136
While the overhaul of the system was intended, at least in part, to facilitate
compliance with Brady requirements, some interviewees were skeptical that
these changes could achieve such a result. According to a former prosecutor,
"The caseload pressures from the high rate of acceptance necessarily affect
compliance with disclosure obligations. With such high caseloads, there is no
question that errors will be made. You just don't have time to do it all even if you
were inclined to do so." 137
A lawyer supportive of the systemic changes commented, "While the advances
may be impressive, the Office is so blind to their bad discovery practices. They
will defend those as well as bad Connick era cases."' 38 A prosecutor who recently
left the Office said, "Not much has changed regarding Brady compliance."' 3 9 He
explained that the practice is only to disclose information if it would be deemed
"material," by an appellate court. He said, "The hard part is always figuring out if
it is material. We ask, 'will this get reversed if we do not turn it over?' Then it is
material." 40 This interviewee, along with several others, represented this
calculus to be the analysis of Brady material in the current administration.
Despite these views, the Office has implemented significant written policies
for disclosure compliance. In December 2011, Martin sent a detailed and
thorough letter to the chiefs of three New Orleans police agencies, reminding
them of their duty to produce documents, recordings, reports, and physical
evidence in each case, and requesting that each department "inform [its] officers,
investigators, and the custodians of any reports, documentation or recordings that
they have a duty to disclose the existence of those items and to provide this office

134. Interview 10 (Feb. 2, 2012).
135. Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012).
136. Interview 7 (Feb. 2, 2012).
137. Interview 11 (Feb. 2, 2012).
138. Interview 4 (Jan. 18, 2012). Remarkably, current and some former prosecutors still defend the Orleans
Parish DA's argument in Smith v. Cain, arguing that the withheld information was not "material" because there
was not a reasonable probability that it would have changed the outcome. Despite the utter rejection of this
interpretation by Justices of the Supreme Court, the view persists. It demonstrates that "materiality"
assessments by New Orleans prosecutors are troubling.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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with a copy of those items."'41
In January 2012, Martin implemented a policy requiring prosecutors to sign a
written disclosure document at both the case screening stage and the pretrial
stage. 1 4 2 The "screening review affidavit" contains provisions for compliance
in four specific categories, including "Kyles efforts, D.A. file review, witness
statements, and a category containing specific questions related to victim and
witness impeachment information." The affidavit then requires the prosecutor's
signature and affirmation that he or she is "not aware of any evidence that is
exculpatory, favorable to the defendant or may be used to impeach a witness that
is not accounted for in a Notice of Disclosure or in discoverable material."l 4 3
The extent to which such practices can change the culture in New Orleans
remains questionable. First, prosecutors are suspicious about the "Brady
affidavits."'" "These affidavits are just a way to blame individuals so that the
Office does not have to take responsibility."l 45 Graymond Martin acknowledges
that the disclosure affidavits and the letter to police agencies certainly will
"plug any hole" for civil liability left open by Connick v. Thompson. Whether,
and to what extent, these measures will have the effect of encouraging
compliance remains to be seen. Cultural change in any context is slow going and
often met with resistance; departure from deeply ingrained cultural practices is

difficult.14 6
Some stakeholders remarked that the Office's new oversight procedures,
its attempt to control all decisions, the culture of fear among prosecutors about
being blamed for errors or losing cases, and the increasingly difficult working
conditions-including the low pay and long hours-make it worse in Cannizzaro's administration than in Connick's. One former prosecutor said:
When Connick was running the Office, the prevailing attitude was to win at
all costs. I don't think the attitude is now win at all costs. There is no such
mandate. What you have, however, is [a system where] if you lose a case, you
are potentially going to be shifted off to juvenile court or child support. This is
totally unfair and unrealistic because we have garbage cases all the time. No
one will be fired, but everyone is terrified that they will be moved and chased
out of the Office.1 47

141. Letter from Graymond Martin, First Assistant Dist. Attorney, Orleans Parish, to Ronal W. Serpas, Chief
of Police, Darryl Albert, Deputy Superintendent, Field Operations Bureau, and Kirk Bouyelas, Deputy
Superintendent, Investigations and Support Bureau (Dec. 2, 2011) (on file with author).
142. The "Disclosure Obligation Review" contains different provisions for disclosure to the defense at the
screening and pretrial stages (on file with author).
143. New prosecutorial measures (on file with author).
144. The document is not in the form of an affidavit but was referred to as a "Brady affidavit" by several
interviewees and will be referred to herein as an "affidavit."
145. Interview 10 (Feb. 2, 2012).
146. Cardozo Law Symposium, supra note 34, at 141.
147. Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012).
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When asked whether this practice of "demoting" attorneys to juvenile court
or child support might encourage attorneys to cheat, another former prosecutor
replied, "Sure. The default position becomes 'win at all costs.'" 1 8 Another
former prosecutor emphasized, "No one is making a career of that office. Because prosecutors are transitory, [they are] likely to be motivated to maximize
professional gain-which means they will aim to seek the most convictions
possible, even if this means committing misconduct. They know they will not
be punished for winning, so there is little incentive to comply with the law."l 4 9
Several recent cases may contribute to the perception that, despite some
changes, disclosure violations persist in the District Attorney's Office. In 2009,
the murder conviction of Michael Anderson was reversed after the defense
learned that prosecutors under Cannizzaro had failed to turn over video-taped
testimony of a key eyewitness, who contradicted her own testimony "several
times." 50 Furthermore, the recent prosecution of Jamaal Tucker has raised
additional suspicions following revelations that Cannizzaro personally brokered
a deal for several witnesses on charges in another jurisdiction without revealing
these deals to the defense before Mr. Tucker stood trial.' 5 ' Current and former
prosecutors provide lengthy explanations for the prosecutors' actions in both of
these cases, but the press, defense and civil rights lawyers, and even some
New Orleans judges appear skeptical of these explanations and regard these cases
as instances of yet additional failures to comply with disclosure requirements.
The willingness of the administration to reverse convictions, however, indicates
to some that the Office is engaged in positive change. 5 2 Some of those
interviewed note that these reversals are not an indication of changes in policy,
but are few in number and driven by concerns for the Office's credibility. 153
Cannizzaro has not directly addressed the question whether instituting a
system of open file discovery (OFD) would make the discovery process in New
Orleans easier, or reduce the District Attorney's work in reformulating its
discovery practice. In an interview that touched on OFD as an efficient means of

148. Interview 9 (Feb. 2, 2012).
149. Interview 17 (Feb. 3, 2012); Christopher Deal, Brady MaterialityBefore Trial: The Scope of the Duty to
Discloseand the Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1780, 1782 (2007).
150. See Gwen Filosa, Judge Grants New Trial in 2006 Central City Massacre Case, TIMES PICAYUNE,
Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/03/judge-grants-michael andersonnewtrial.html.
151. See Defense Attorneys Agree to Scrap 2010 Murder Conviction, WWLTV.coM EYEWITNESS NEWS
(Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://www.wwltv.com/news/Cannizzaro-defense-agree-to-scrap-2010-murderconviction-i 35620483.html.
152. "While Brady violations have haunted the district attorney's office for years-most notably during
Harry Connick's tenure-Loyola Law Professor Dane Ciolino said the response to this case is a step in the right
direction. 'In the past the DA's office fought tooth and nail to preserve convictions, even when, to many
observers, there were blatant Brady violations,' Ciolino said. 'It's encouraging that the district attorney's office
realized that there was a Brady violation, acknowledged it and stepped up and voluntarily agreed to correct the
conviction."' Id.
153. Interview I (Nov. 15, 2011).
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effecting change within the Office, Cannizzaro replied, "Well, right now the law
in Louisiana is that we are not obligated to engage in open file discovery."154

VI. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
What will change the practices and culture of the Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office? Will it come from internal changes in policy and practices,
external controls by disciplinary committees, courts, and commissions, or some
combination of all these accountability mechanisms? The history of noncompliance with disclosure obligations and the current culture suggest that both internal
and external changes are essential if there is to be significant progress in New
Orleans. Internal changes alone appear to be insufficient. Despite the disclosure
practices implemented by the Cannizzaro administration, the interviews point to
the need for additional internal changes and external accountability to augment
and reinforce internal policies. An interviewee who had a long and deep history
with all aspects of the criminal justice system was blunt about the need for
external controls to make any serious change in practice: "A few heads are going
to have to roll, or I just don't see it."155
A. INTERNAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES
A coherent and consistently applied internal policy is fundamental to insuring
good disclosure practices. Such a policy must include not only clear, written
disclosure standards, but also effective hiring, training, supervising and monitoring lawyers to insure that the standards are met.' 6
The recent adoption of "Brady affidavits" is a step towards improved
compliance with disclosure obligations. This written requirement alone is
insufficient to ensure effective disclosure practices, however, because "compliance with rules and laws . . . is likely to be determined by the complex interplay
of internal and personal considerations such as office culture and policy, office
regulatory and supervisory practices, and prosecutors' own professional values." 157 Thus, the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office needs to implement
changes in protocols, training, and enforcement mechanisms. It also must focus
on cultural change, that is, a change in prosecutors' overall understanding of their
role in the criminal justice system.
An essential start to any significant reform is to eliminate the pretrial
"materiality" determination of what constitutes discoverable information. The
disclosure of information to the defense should not depend upon a prosecutor's
pretrial assessment of the likely effect of that information on the outcome as
154.
155.
156.
157.

See Allman, supra note 112.
Interview 7 (Feb. 2, 2012).
Cardozo Law Symposium, supra note 34.
Yaroshefsky & Green, supranote 36, at 270.
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viewed from the appellate perspective-that is, whether the withheld information
would create a reasonable possibility of a different result had it been disclosed to
the defense in time to be used during the investigation and litigation of the
original proceeding.' 8 Cognitive biases such as tunnel vision and confirmation
bias make plain that even well intentioned prosecutors cannot be expected to
assess whether a defense attorney would consider information exculpatory or
useful for impeachment purposes.' 59 Prosecutors cannot and should not be
expected to make accurate ex ante estimations of materiality that will inevitably
be clouded by their belief that the defendant is guilty. For these reasons, the
Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office should adopt a policy that "materiality"
is not part of the pretrial disclosure assessment. Without such a change, the new
practice of "Brady affidavits" that appear to require broader production of
information to the defense will be ineffectual. This is of particular significance
in New Orleans because, like many jurisdictions around the country, it does
not have robust disclosure laws or policies. Instead, it is a jurisdiction where
"both the culture of the office and the attitudes of individual prosecutors perceive
themselves as participants in a highly adversarial, often non-cooperative
process."16 0 Consequently, prosecutors are likely to err on the side of nondisclosure even if materiality were not a consideration.161
Second, it is essential to adopt written protocols about disclosure obligations
and mechanisms for their enforcement. This includes effective training programs, which do not currently exist. A 2009 conference of prosecutors, defense
attorneys, judges, police personnel, and policy analysts from around the country
discussed and reported on the substance of effective protocols, practices, training
programs, and methods of enforcement.1 6 2 These include:
* clear, written guidelines;
* case information checklists;
* systems to ensure the full flow and retention of information from the police
and other government agencies to the prosecutor's office;

158. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) ("The prosecution, which alone can know what is
undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence
and make disclosure when the point of [materiality] is reached."); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108
(1976) ("the significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is
complete"), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
159. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations:Report of the Working Group on Best Practices:Systems and Culture, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 1961,
1995-2010 (2010).
160. Yaroshefsky & Greeen, supra note 36, at 280.
161. Unfortunately, nondisclosure as a practice in the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office has been well
documented. See infra note 32.
162. See generally Cardozo Law Symposium, supra note 34.
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* adoption of electronic systems for file retention and dissemination of
information;
* random audits of files;

* formal and informal training that includes simulations and training on
cognitive bias; and
* adoption and enforcement of effective internal disciplinary protocols and
practices.
Finally, the Orleans Parish District Attorney should establish a Conviction
Integrity Unit to examine wrongful conviction cases to determine their causes
and remedies and to establish standard procedures for new cases to prevent
wrongful convictions. Among other tasks, the Conviction Integrity Unit should
conduct audits when the Office discovers that any prosecutor engaged in actions
that constitute serious negligence or misconduct and affect the integrity of an
investigation or judicial proceeding.16 3 The audit is a standard practice in
business, medicine, and other areas of government. The ultimate goal and
practice of the Conviction Integrity Unit is to focus on "raising awareness and
implementing safeguards, not simply on trying to weed out a handful of rogues or
bad apples." 56 Despite financial and time constraints, at least some of these
practices could be developed and implemented without delay.
Even, however, if many of these suggestions are adopted, the Office must be
cognizant that "office culture and informal understandings may subvert office
policies." 6 5 As in other jurisdictions, policy and training practices may require
prosecutors to comply with the law and "if in doubt, disclose." But actual practice differs due to an interplay of factors. A prosecutor in another jurisdiction
provided commentary that appears applicable to New Orleans:
What we learned in training is not what happened in practice. We were told that
if it was debatable, you should turn it over. In practice, supervisors would not
163. See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelinesfor the Prosecutor's Office, 31 CARDozo L. REv.
2089, 2105-06 (discussing discovery audits); Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs:
Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 2215, 2247
(2010) (documenting the need for audits and other procedures to improve the functioning of criminal justice
systems).
164. Innocence Project New Orleans recently established the Criminal Attorney Accountability Working
Group, (CAAWG) which seeks to improve accountability for unethical lawyers in the criminal system. The
Working Group includes participants from the District Attorney's Offices from Orleans and Jefferson Parishes,
the Louisiana Public Defender Board, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana, the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, the Louisiana House of Representatives, three of Louisiana's four law schools, the Louisiana State Bar
Association, as well as members of the private bar. CAAWG will conduct simulation-based programs for
prosecutors and defense attorneys to be jointly trained on their ethical obligations in criminal cases. The first
training will be in New Orleans in October 2012. It will then be conducted in four other cities around the state.
CWAAG will perform assessments of the effectiveness of the trainings and recommend "best practices" policies
for prosecutors' and public defenders' offices on ethics issues. (Materials on file with author).
165. Yaroshefsky & Green, supranote 36, at 282.
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tell you not to turn it over, but there was pressure and you were carefully
scrutinized if you did not hold on until the bitter end with discovery. 166
Consequently, if Orleans Parish expects significant compliance with discovery obligations, the Office's culture of disclosure needs significant change.
This is best accomplished by the adoption of a formal system of full open file
discovery. The term "full open file discovery" refers to a system where the
prosecution insures that it has obtained all information about the case from the
police and all agencies involved and discloses all case-related information to
the defense. Narrow exceptions apply.16 7 This could be implemented as internal
policy. Most likely, it would have to originate from a legislative or judicial
initiative.
B. OPEN FILE DISCOVERY
Louisiana should follow the example of North Carolina, the first state that
adopted full open file discovery. Ohio adopted a similar law. 1 6 8 A recent study of
the effect of North Carolina's statute in practice by scholar Janet Moore found
that full open file discovery statutes increase the "fairness, finality, and efficiency
of criminal adjudications and provide[] a model for national reform of discovery
rules and laws."
The North Carolina statute requires the prosecutor to provide the complete
investigative files, including any material obtained by law enforcement, to the
defense before trial including investigators' notes, the required recordation of all
oral statements, and any other information obtained during the investigation.' 69 It
provides for work product privileges to "protect the prosecuting attorney's
mental processes while allowing the defendant access to factual information
collected by the state."o The statute provides for ex parte motions to limit
disclosure if there is any "substantial risk to any person" of harm, intimidation, or
even "unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment."' 7 ' There is also reciprocal

discovery.172 Moore concludes:1 7 3

166. Id.
167. Many offices have an "open file policy," but the definitions vary considerably. One office might invite
defense counsel to view all information gathered in a case, while another office may simply give the defense
substantial, but not total, access to its files. Some may have little in the file thus the term "open file" does not
provide meaningful access to information. Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 36, at 279. Consequently, the most
effective enforcement of full open file discovery is by codification of the requirements in court rules or by
statute ("Codified open file discovery").
168. See supra note 28.
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1). The combination of provisions in the North Carolina statutes qualify
North Carolina's reform as "full" open file discovery.
170. See Moore, supra note 29, at 8 (citations omitted).
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-908.
172. Id. at § 15A-905-906.
173. Moore, supra note 29, at 43.
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Fact-finders make better decisions when adversaries present their strongest
admissible evidence in the most compelling manner. Reliable adjudications
decrease the need for additional litigation to address errors through pretrial
hearings, appeals, state and federal post-conviction procedures, and civil rights
actions. The finality of reliable verdicts increases public confidence in the
transparency and accountability of adjudicatory systems. Finality and reliability also reduce the significant costs resulting from alleged and actual error in
criminal cases-costs borne by defendants, crime victims and survivors, their
families, and the taxpayers who support prosecutors, public defenders, courts,
and prisons.1 74
It would be worthwhile to establish a commission of all stakeholders in the
criminal justice system to study the implementation of open file discovery laws or
rules in Louisiana.
C. EXTERNAL SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Good disclosure practices require systems of monitoring and accountability.17 5
New Orleans needs to improve external incentives toward better compliance with
law and rules.
These incentives are unlikely to come from the judiciary, which appears to be
unable or unwilling to monitor or control disclosure practices. "Judges are so
beaten down by constantly having to battle with D.A.'s on these issues that they
want to go the path of least resistance. They have to get elected."' 7 6 Despite this
view, without enforcement of Brady requirements and sanctions for intentional
violations of law, change will be difficult. "Judges should have a central role in
ensuring that the attorneys practicing before them are abiding by the rules and
ethics of the profession. This should happen at all stages-pretrial, at trial, and
through the appellate process." 7 7
One mechanism to encourage compliance with disclosure obligations is a
mandatory formal pretrial conference where the court ensures that the prosecution has disclosed specific categories of information, and that the parties are fully
aware of their respective disclosure obligations under statutes and ethical rules.
The court enters an order requiring such compliance, and obtains the prosecutor's

174. For data on prison costs alone, see, e.g., Council of State Governments, Justice Reinvestment: Facts and
Trends, http://justicereinvestment.org/facts-andtrends; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence,
Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarmentof Mike Nifong: The CriticalImportance of Full Open-File Discovery,
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 264-85 (2008); Alafair Burke, Revisiting ProsecutorialDisclosure, 84 IND. L.J.
481 (2010); Richard Rosen, Reflections on Innocence,2006 Wis. L. REV. 237,271-73 (recommending full open
file discovery).
175. See generally Cardozo Law Symposium, supranote 34.
176. Interview I (Dec. 1, 2011).
177. Cardozo Law Symposium, supra note 34, at 2031.
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assurances on the record. 7 8
However, most interviewees did not believe that the judiciary would assume
a more active role in assuring compliance with discovery.' 79 Instead, they
suggested that controls over disclosure practices and the conduct of prosecutors
will have to be imposed by the bar association and the Louisiana Supreme Court.
This would require a sea change in the disciplinary system. Nationally, the bar
disciplinary process has not been effective in sanctioning clearly identified acts of
misconduct, and criminal prosecutions are so rare they do not serve as a
deterrent.' 8 0 New Orleans mirrors that experience. A former judge said: "We
have never had a D.A. who was suspended from practice for failure to act in accordance with law. No one was ever disbarred. Disciplinary committees are
ineffectual. We could, we should, incentivize good behavior by punishing bad
behavior."' 8 ' According to a person with extensive experience with the criminal
justice practices in New Orleans, "All systems must punish bad actors-you can
train till hell freezes over until we decide, as a system, that we will not tolerate
these ethics anymore. Once we indicate that we won't tolerate this, no training is
needed." 1 8 2 Until disciplinary bodies assume responsibility for sanctioning misconduct, there will remain weak incentives for compliance with ethics rules.183
The current system of lack of judicial and disciplinary oversight suggests that a
judicial or legislative body should establish an Independent Oversight Board that
would undertake a review of current systems to determine mechanisms to
improve disclosure practices and restore public confidence in the criminal justice
system. The District Attorney could initiate the creation of such a body with
representation of all stakeholders in the criminal justice system. It could have a
broad mandate to review current practices, hold hearings, and propose necessary
changes.
CONCLUSION
The current Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office continues to operate
under the many serious constraints of the New Orleans criminal justice system

178. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Smith v. Cain,
565 U.S. - (2012) (recommending pretrial compliance conferences).
179. It is disturbing that all interviewees had significant criticisms of the judiciary but had few expectations
of positive change. There seemed to be resignation to a relatively dysfunctional judiciary. The Louisiana
Supreme Court should undertake examination of the functioning of the lower courts.
180. KATHLEEN M. RIDDFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997-2009 (2010), available at http://law.scu.edu/neip/file/Prosecutorial
MisconductLBookEntire-online%20version.pdf.; see also Keenan et al., supra note 41.
181. Interview 14 (Feb. 3, 2012).
182. Interview 7 (Feb. 2, 2012).
183. Improved enforcement of disciplinary rules requires that the conduct that violates the rules is reported
to the disciplinary committees. Historically, few complaints of ethical violations by prosecutors have been
reported to the Disciplinary Committee. Interview I (Nov. 15, 2011).
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and its unique political and institutional concerns. The Cannizzaro administration
has implemented changes in internal policy and practices, but whether any of
them will improve compliance with disclosure obligations is an open question.
In New Orleans, systemic changes in disclosure practices are unlikely to occur
without improved internal controls and external interventions-from judges,
disciplinary committees, and the legislature-designed to ensure accountability
with the law. Because institutional reform often occurs slowly, perhaps the most
effective mechanism to improve discovery practices is through the enactment of
laws or court rules requiring the full disclosure of specified categories of
information; these rules are referred to in jurisdictions such as North Carolina and
Ohio as "full open file" discovery (codified open file discovery). Of course, the
judiciary must enforce these statutory requirements. Pretrial compliance conferences and imposition of sanctions for violations of discovery orders are essential.
Other suggested reforms include an independent commission to evaluate and
recommend practices and policies to improve the functioning of the criminal
justice system. Without serious consideration and implementation of such
proposals, significant changes in discovery practice in New Orleans are unlikely.

